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1 Introduction
The linear instrumental variables (IV) estimator, in which the dependent variable is a
linear function of a potentially endogenous regressor, is a major workhorse in empirical
economics and gaining ground in other sciences. When this regressor takes on multi-
ple values, so-called \variable treatment intensity," the linear specication restricts the
marginal eects to be constant across all margins. There are numerous applications with
variable treatment intensity, including the economic return to schooling, class size and
child development, family size and child quality, fertility and maternal labor supply, family
income and child development, and maternal smoking and children's birth weight.
In most applications with variable treatment intensity, the linear specication does not
come from economic theory, but is rather chosen out of convenience or because there may
not be enough instruments available (or they are too weak) to instrument for multiple
endogenous regressors. In the spirit of Leamer's (1983) seminal critique of empirical
economics, the results from studies relying on such an arbitrarily chosen functional form
should be interpreted with caution. The remedy Leamer proposed was sensitivity analysis,
in which researchers examine how their results vary with changes in functional form.
Over the last few years, however, it has been argued that the linearity restriction gives
little cause for concern. The argument is twofold. First, the relationship between the
dependent variable and the regressor of interest might in many cases be approximately
linear.2 And second, even if the relationship is nonlinear, the weighted average of marginal
eects produced by the linearly restricted estimator might still be a relevant parameter
for testing theory or assessing policy. These arguments are advocated forcefully in the
review article by Angrist and Pischke (2010), who state that: \an emerging grasp of the
sense in which regression and two-stage least squares [IV] produce average eects when
the underlying relationship is heterogeneous and/or nonlinear has made functional form
concerns less central. The linear models that constitute the workhorse of contemporary
empirical practice usually turn out to be remarkably robust" (p. 10). However, others
have challenged this view of linear models, arguing instead that a careful exploration of
possible nonlinearities is of central importance in empirical research.3
In this paper, we investigate the problems caused by the linearity restriction in IV
estimation, and discuss possible remedies. The rst part of the paper builds on previous
research showing that the linear OLS and IV estimands can be decomposed into weighted
2A generalization of this argument is that for some transformation of the dependent variable or the
regressor of interest, e.g. the log transformation, the relationship is approximately linear. We examine
this issue in the context of a particular application.
3See e.g. Keane (2010a), Sims (2010) and Stock (2010). Their comments also discuss a number of
other aspects of the so-called experimentalist approach to empirical economics, advocated by Angrist
and Pischke (2010). See also the comments by Leamer (2010) and Nevo and Whinston (2010), as well
as the recent discussions in Deaton (2010), Heckman and Urzua (2010), Imbens (2010), Keane (2010b),
and Heckman (2010).Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 2
averages of marginal eect estimates, where the OLS and IV weights are in general dier-
ent (see Angrist and Imbens, 1995; Yitzhaki, 1996; Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Heckman,
Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006). Using such decompositions, we examine the the biases due
to nonlinearity in commonly used tests for treatment eects, selection bias, and instru-
ment validity. The insights from our analysis may be summarized in the following four
conclusions:
(i) The linearly restricted IV estimator can lead to a conclusion of a zero treatment eect
even if some (or all) marginal eects are non-zero. In particular, the bias in using linear
models when the marginal eects are non-constant is one-sided, and can only lead to
under-rejection of the null hypothesis of no treatment eect.
(ii) The linear IV estimator may assign negative weights to some marginal eects. An
implication of the negative weights is that the linear IV estimator can be negative (posi-
tive) even if all the marginal eects are strictly positive (negative). Negative weights can
be ruled out by assuming monotonicity in the direction the instrument aects treatment
intensity across treatment levels, which is is directly testable.
(iii) Because the OLS estimator and the IV estimator of the linearly restricted model
generally assign dierent weights to the marginal eects, nonlinearities can lead to a
conclusion of selection bias even when the regressor is exogenous, or lead to a conclusion
of no selection bias even when the regressor is endogenous. We therefore propose a
diagnostic tool designed to tell to what extent linear OLS and IV estimates dier because
of dierent weighting of marginal eects.
(iv) Over-identication tests comparing the linear IV estimator using dierent instruments
can be misleading, as nonlinearities can mask instrument invalidity or lead to an erroneous
conclusion of instrument validity. The reason is that dierent instruments generally assign
dierent weights to the marginal eects.
To emphasize the distinction between the issues related to functional form and other
commonly cited issues with IV estimation, we show that the above results are solely due
to nonlinearity, and not to heterogeneity in the marginal eects, instrument invalidity, or
weak instruments.
To demonstrate that the implications of the linearity restriction in IV estimation are
not merely theoretical peculiarities but real cause for concern, the second part of the
paper considers three applications with variable treatment intensity: the economic return
to schooling, the link between family size and child quality, and the eect of childhood
family income on child development. The choice of applications is not incidental. In all
three cases, economic theory and OLS results suggest a nonlinear relationship between
the dependent variable and the regressor of interest, yet previous research has typically
used linearly restricted IV estimators. It should be emphasized that our focus is not
on instrument validity or weak instruments: Our point of departure is to illustrate theLinear Instrumental Variables Estimation 3
implications of nonlinearities in IV estimation of linearly restricted models, using the same
data and instruments as in already published papers.
From the applications, we have four empirical ndings:
(i) In each of our applications, the OLS results (with controls for observable confounding
factors) suggest highly nonlinear relationships, consistent with the theoretical predictions.
This evidence of nonlinearities in the OLS estimates raises serious doubts of the appro-
priateness of the linearity restriction in the IV estimation.
(ii) From estimating the linear IV weights, we learn that even though the linear IV esti-
mators produce some weighted average of underlying marginal eects, it is not clear how
they should be interpreted and what policy question they could answer. On the one hand,
the IV weights are quite dierent from the sample distribution of the regressor of interest.
This indicates that the linear IV estimate will likely dier from the average marginal eect
across the population distribution of the regressor, or some other typical policy-relevant
treatment parameter.4 On the other hand, the linear IV estimates do not identify specic
marginal eects, since they tend to place non-trivial weight on several treatment margins.
This suggests that the linearly restricted IV estimates are not interpretable as the eect
on particular margins.
(iii) The OLS and IV estimates of the linearly restricted model assign dierent weights to
the marginal eects. In fact, in one of the applications we consider, the linear IV estimator
assigns negative weights to some marginal eects. The dierences in weighting implies
that linear IV estimates are not directly comparable to the linear OLS estimates. As a
consequence, the commonly used tests for selection should be interpreted with caution.
In one of the applications, for example, the proposed diagnostic tool tells us that about
half of the dierence between the linear OLS and IV estimates is a result of dierent
weighting of marginal eects.
(iv) In each application, we nd that the IV estimates are not robust to relaxing the
linearity restriction. In particular, allowing for a more exible functional form changes
the qualitative conclusions about the relevant economic theory and the eectiveness of
dierent policies.
The general lesson to be drawn from this paper is not that IV estimation of linearly re-
stricted models is of little use in applications with variable treatment intensity. Rather,
our ndings echo the argument of Leamer (1983) that functional form concerns are in-
escapable in empirical research. In fact, IV estimation may exacerbate the sensitivity of
the results to the linearity restriction: While the linear IV weights depend on the partic-
ular instrument chosen and the correlation of that instrument with the various treatment
margins, the OLS weights solely depend on the sample distribution of the regressor of
4The average marginal eect is sometimes referred to as the average partial eect. See Heckman and
Vytlacil (2001) for a discussion of policy-relevant treatment parameters.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 4
interest. The ideal remedy is non-parametric IV estimation, or at least some exible form
of parametric estimation to show how the results vary with changes in functional form
assumptions.5 In some situations, however, such analysis might be infeasible because of
small sample size or not enough (or too weak) instruments. In any case, one can compute
the weights to learn what the linear estimators actually identify and interpret the results
in view of that. And if the weighting diers across linear estimates, the commonly used
tests for selection bias and instrument validity should be interpreted with caution.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 reviews what linear OLS and
IV estimators identify, and Section 3 examines the implications of nonlinearities for the
inference drawn from these linear estimators. Section 4 reports the empirical results from
the three applications. Section 5 concludes.
2 What Linear Estimators Identify
This section reviews what linearly restricted OLS and IV estimators identify when the
endogenous regressor takes on multiple values.
2.1 Potential outcomes, linearity, and marginal eects
Let fi(s) denote the potential (or latent) outcome that individual i would receive with
treatment intensity s. In the return to schooling application, for example, fi(s) describes
the potential earnings that individual i would receive with s years of schooling. In general,
fi(s) is determined by aspects of individual behavior and market forces. Without an
explicit theoretical model for fi(s), we can think of this function as describing the outcome
that individual i would achieve if he or she was randomly assigned treatment intensity s.
The observed treatment intensity received by individual i is denoted Si.
The standard regression framework used in the previous literature to link the potential
outcome to the observed outcome, yi, has the following form
yi = fi(Si) =  + Si + i; (1)
where i is a mean-zero error term. This linearly restricted model forms the basis for most
previous studies using IV strategies to address the concern for selection bias in regression
analysis. Our point of departure is to relax the linearity assumption, allowing instead the
marginal treatment eects to vary with the treatment level. Let the treatment variable
5See e.g. Horowitz (2009) and Newey and Powell (2003) for discussions of non-parametric IV estima-
tion. In all of the applications we consider, the support of the endogenous regressor is either discrete and
the non-parametric model has a nite number of parameters, or we estimate less restrictive parametric
models. We therefore avoid the \ill posed inverse" problem of non-parametric IV estimation. See also
Abadie (2003) for a discussion of IV estimation of nonlinear models with a binary endogenous regressor.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 5
take on values in the nite set Si 2 f0;1;:::;  sg. Using dummy variables constructed as
dsi = 1fSi  sg, we can specify the following non-parametric model
yi =  +
 s X
s=1
sdsi + i; (2)
where the s coecient represents the marginal eect of an increase in treatment intensity
from s   1 to s, and i is a mean-zero error term. The non-parametric model (2) nests
the linear model (1), which restricts the marginal treatment eects to be independent of
the level of treatment: s =  for all s > 0.
Note that both (1) and (2) assumes that the marginal eects are homogenous across
individuals: The only individual-specic component is the error terms, which capture
unobserved factors determining the outcome. We assume homogenous marginal eects
to focus attention on the implications of nonlinearity in linearly restricted models. In
contrast, much of the discussion on IV estimation has been focused on population het-
erogeneity in treatment eects in situations with a binary treatment variable. We simply
reverse the focus. And even if there is heterogeneity in the marginal eects, which could
be represented in (2) as random coecients on the dsi indicators, s is still interpretable
as the average marginal eect of increasing treatment intensity from s 1 to s. However,
with heterogeneity in the marginal eects, the linear IV estimator should be interpreted as
a weighted average of the marginal local average treatment eects (LATE). The marginal
LATEs are the average marginal eects for the particular groups whose treatment status
is shifted by the instrument.6 In our empirical analysis, we discuss the issue of population
heterogeneity in the marginal eects.
2.2 IV Decomposition
Angrist and Imbens (1995) provide a decomposition of the linear IV estimand in the
case of a binary instrument and under an assumption of monotonicity. We oer an
alternative decomposition result, and moreover, discuss how the linear IV estimator can
assign negative weights to some marginal eects if monotonicity does not hold.7
Consider the case of a scalar (binary or multi-valued) instrument zi. We discuss the
case of multiple instruments below. Suppose that the standard IV assumptions hold:
Assumption A1 (Instrument Uncorrelated with Error Term): Cov(i;zi) = 0.
6See Imbens and Angrist (1994), Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006), and Angrist and Imbens
(1995) for discussions of the LATE interpretation of IV estimates. While the former two studies focus
on the case of a binary treatment variable, the latter study considers a situation with variable treatment
intensity.
7In the return to schooling application of Angrist and Krueger (1991), for example, monotonicity
means that people born in the fourth quarter (who are obliged to stay in school longer due to compulsory
schooling laws) get at least as much schooling as they would have if they had been born in the rst
quarter. See also Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), and Barua and Lang (2009) for a critical discussion of
the monotonicity assumption, and examples of situations where it is likely to fail.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 6
Assumption A2 (Instrument Correlated with Endogenous Regressor): Cov(Si;zi) 6= 0.
Assumption A1 implies that the instrument is uncorrelated with the unobserved factors
determining the outcome. Note that the stronger assumption of the instrument being
independent of all potential outcomes and potential treatment intensities, as in Angrist
and Imbens (1995), would imply Assumption A1. Assumption A2 is a standard condition
of the existence of an instrument, implying that the instrument aects treatment intensity.
Under Assumptions A1 and A2, the IV estimand for  in (1) is (z) = Cov(yi;zi)=Cov(Si;zi).
To decompose (z) into a weighted average of the marginal eects s, substitute for yi in
(2), which yields
Cov(yi;zi) = Cov(( + 1d1i +  +  sd si + i);zi)
= 1Cov(d1i;zi) +  +  sCov(d s;i;zi) + Cov(i;zi):










These weights sum to one,8 and can be directly estimated using the sample analog of the
expression above.
We learn from (3) that (z) is a weighted average of the marginal treatment eects.
The weight ws(z) attached to s depends on the covariance between each dsi indicator
and the instrument. Hence, (z) assigns more weight to the marginal eects at treatment
levels that are most aected by the particular instrument chosen.
From (3), it is also clear that some (but not all) ws(z) might be negative. Negative
weights occur in situations where the instrument increases treatment intensity at some
level of treatment, but decreases it at other levels of treatment, so that Cov(dsi;zi) varies in
sign depending on s. The possibility of negative weights has some troubling implications.
First, (z) is not necessarily restricted to lie between the maximum and minimum s,
when the IV weights are negative. As a consequence, (z) may not be representative of
any particular marginal eect or subset of marginal eects. An additional implication of
negative IV weights is that the linear IV estimator can be negative (positive) even if all
8To see that the ws(z) weights sum to 1, note that Si =
P s
s=1 dsi, so that Cov(Si;zi) = P s
s=1 Cov(dsi;zi).Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 7
of the marginal eects are strictly positive (negative).
To ensure non-negative weights (ws(z)  0 for all s), one can assume monotonicity in
the direction the instrument aects treatment intensity across treatment levels:
Assumption A3 (Treatment Margin Monotonicity): Either Cov(dsi;zi)  0 for all s or
Cov(dsi;zi)  0 for all s.
Note that the stronger assumption of monotonicity for each individual (i.e. the instru-
ment eects everyone in the same way, if at all), as in Angrist and Imbens (1995), or
equivalently \uniformity" of response to treatment, as in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005),
would imply Assumption A3. However, Assumption A3 is a weaker assumption requiring
only that the sign of the covariance is the same across all margins, which is sucient to
ensure non-negative IV weighting across all margins.9 Unlike individual level monotonic-
ity, Assumption A3 is directly testable since we can estimate Cov(dsi;zi) for all s. The
reason is that Assumption A3 does not involve unobserved counterfactual responses to
various instrument values, as with the individual level monotonicity assumption. In one
of the applications we examine, Assumption A3 actually fails and the linear IV estimator
assigns negative weights to some marginal eects.
It should nally be noted that with Assumption A3 and a binary instrument zi 2
f0;1g, it follows straightforwardly that (3) coincides with the IV decomposition proposed
by Angrist and Imbens (1995):
ws(z) =
pr(dsi = 1jzi = 1)   pr(dsi = 1)
P c
j=1 pr(dji = 1jzi = 1)   pr(dji = 1)
;
since Cov(dsi;zi) = pr(zi = 1)[pr(dsi = 1jzi = 1)   pr(dsi = 1)].
2.3 OLS Decomposition
Next, we provide an analagous decomposition for the linear OLS estimator which allows
us to compare the OLS weighting to the IV weighting. The OLS estimand for  in (1)








+  ; (4)
where   = Cov(i;Si)=V ar(Si). This expression shows that the linear OLS estimand is
a weighted average of the marginal eects s, and a selection bias term,  .
9Even if individual level monotonicity is violated, and some individuals have a non-uniform response
to an instrument, Assumption A3 could still hold. However, the stronger assumption of individual mono-
tonicity would be required for a LATE interpretation of the IV estimand in a situation with heterogenous
treatment eects.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 8
We can further decompose the linear OLS estimand into a weighted sum of the non-
parameteric OLS estimands. The non-parametric OLS estimand for s in (2) is given
by
s(OLS) = E[yijSi = s]   E[yijSi = s   1]:
Substituting for yi, we have
s(OLS) = s + 4s;
where 4s = E[ijSi = s]   E[ijSi = s   1] represents the selection bias in the OLS
estimates of the marginal eects, s(OLS). To see the relationship between   and 4s,
note that we can write the linear projection of i on d1i;:::;d s;i as
i = 41d1i +  + 4 sd s;i + !i;
where Cov(!i;dsi) = 0 for all s by denition of the linear projection. Substituting this
expression for i, and noting that Cov(!i;dsi) = 0 for all s implies Cov(!i;Si) = 0, we can









Finally, substituting this expression for   into (4) and re-arranging, we can write the










These OLS weights are simply the regression coecient of dsi = 1fSi  sg on Si. The
OLS weights sum to one,10 and can be directly estimated using the sample analog of the
above expressions. Note that unlike the linear IV weights, the linear OLS weights are
strictly non-negative since Cov(dsi;Si)  0 for all s.
In general, the linear IV weight assigned to a given marginal eect, ws(z), is dierent
from the linear OLS weight assigned to the same marginal eect, ws(OLS). While the
10The weights sum to 1 since
P s
s=1 Cov(dsi;Si) = V ar(Si).Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 9
linear IV weights depend on the particular instrument chosen and the correlation of that
instrument with the various treatment margins, the OLS weights solely depend on the
sample distribution of the regressor Si. To see this, we can re-write the Cov(dsi;Si) terms
as
Cov(dsi;Si) = E[dsiSi]   pr(dsi = 1)E[Si]
= (E[Sijdsi = 1]   E[Sijdsi = 0])pr(dsi = 1)(1   pr(dsi = 1)):







qs = (E[SijSi  s]   E[SijSi < s])(pr(Si  s)(1   pr(Si  s)):
An equivalent result is derived in Angrist and Krueger (1999), drawing on results from
Yitzhaki (1996).
There are two key issues with OLS estimation in situations with variable treatment
intensity. As is well known, OLS estimates will be biased if observed treatment intensity is
correlated with the unobserved factors determining the outcome. The second issue, which
has received far less attention in empirical research, is that the linear OLS estimand has
a particular weighting over the marginal eects, given by (5). Specically, weight is given
to each s in proportion to the conditional mean of Si, above and below s. More weight
is also given to marginal eects close to the sample median of Si, since this is where
pr(Si  s)(1 pr(Si  s)) is maximized. If there are nonlinearities in the OLS estimates
of the marginal eects (s(OLS) 6= s0(OLS) for s 6= s0), then it follows from (5) that
the linear OLS estimate depends on how it weights the marginal eects, and thereby the
sample distribution of Si. Depending on the weights, the linear OLS estimate ranges
between the maximum and minimum s(OLS).
2.4 Decomposition with Covariates and Multiple Instruments
In most empirical work, the IV assumptions are assumed to hold conditional on a set of
covariates. Moreover, many studies use several instruments in the IV estimation. In all
the three applications we consider, for example, previous research have included covariates
in a linear fashion, and used multiple instruments. In such situations, we need to modify
the above decompositions to estimate the linear OLS and IV weights.
Consider rst the case where a vector of exogenous covariates, Xi, is added to (1).
The linearly restricted model is then given byLinear Instrumental Variables Estimation 10
yi = X
0
i + Si + i; (6)
where Xi includes the intercept. In order to derive the linear OLS weights, we transform
the model using residual regression. Specically, Si is regressed on Xi, producing the
residual S
i = Si   X0
i^ , where ^  is the estimated regression coecients. The linear
OLS estimand is then (OLS) = Cov(yi;S
i )=V ar(S
i ), and the associated weights are
ws(OLS) = Cov(dsi;S
i )=V ar(S
i ) for all s. Note that while the OLS weights in models
without additional covariates are strictly non-negative since Cov(dsi;Si)  0, the OLS
weights with covariates could be negative since it is possible that Cov(dsi;S
i ) < 0.
Consider next the case where the linearly restricted model includes a vector of covari-
ates, and multiple instruments are used in the IV estimation. We restrict our attention
to the commonly used Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) IV estimator. The second stage






where Zi is a vector of instruments. The linear 2SLS estimator can be formed by rst
regressing Si on covariates Xi and instruments Zi, to form the tted value ^ Si = X0
i^  +
Z0
i^ , where ^  and ^  are the OLS estimates from the rst stage regression. Next, we
regress ^ Si on covariates Xi alone, producing the residual ^ S
i = ^ Si   X0
i^ , where ^  is
the estimated regression coecients from ^ Si on Xi. The linear IV estimate is then the
sample analog of Cov(yi; ^ S
i )=Cov(^ S





It should be noted that the IV weights in a linear model with covariates, ws(^ S
i ), can be
quite dierent from the IV weights using a single instrument or ignoring covariates. ws(^ S
i )
is the appropriate weight for the linear IV estimator that uses multiple instruments and
includes covariates in a linear fashion, as ^ S
i is the implied instrument in this framework.
3 Testing for Treatment Eects, Selection Bias, and
Instrument Validity
This section uses the above expressions to discuss how inference can be misleading if we
use linear OLS and IV estimators when the true relationship is nonlinear. We consider
testing for non-zero treatment eects, selection bias, and instrument validity. For each
test, we formulate the implicit null hypothesis in terms of the marginal eects, and discuss
the conditions under which using linear test statistics leads to under- or over-rejection of
the null hypothesis. To illustrate, we use a Monte Carlo study. Finally, we propose a
diagnostic tool designed to tell to what extent linear OLS and IV estimates dier becauseLinear Instrumental Variables Estimation 11
of dierent weighting of marginal eects.
3.1 Simulation Example
Our Monte Carlo study is based on a simple example where the treatment variable/regressor
takes on the values 0,1, and 2. The observed outcome is given by
yi = 1d1i + 2d2i + i;
where i  N(0;2
).
The level of treatment is given by
d1i = 1f11z1i + 12z2i + 1;i +  1i  0g;
d2i = d1i1f21z1i + 22z2i + 2;i +  2i  0g;
Si = d1i + d2i
where  si  N(0;2
 s) and zsi is a binary instruments distributed as zsi = 1 with prob-
ability 0.5 and zsi = 0 otherwise, for s = 1;2. The instruments are constructed to be
independent, z1i ? z2i, and both satisfy Assumptions A1-A3.
To illustrate our results, we simulate the model for two combinations of parameters.
Case 1, no selection bias: 1 = 1,  = 10,  1 = 1,  2 = 1, 11 = 3, 12 = 0, 21 = 0,
22 = 3, 1; = 0, 2; = 0.
Case 2, selection bias: Same parameters as Case 1 except that 1; = 0:01, 2; = 0:01.
In each case, we simulate three dierent linear estimators:
1) Linear OLS:
(OLS) = Cov(yi;Si)=V ar(Si):
2) Linear IV using z1i as the instrument:
(z1) = Cov(yi;z1i)=Cov(z1i;Si):
3) Linear IV using z2i as the instrument:
(z2) = Cov(yi;z2i)=Cov(z2i;Si):
In the simulations, we compute the average values of the linear estimates across 500
replications, each using 5000 observations from the data generating process. In every
replication, we set 1 = 1 and vary the other marginal eect 2. As we vary 2 awayLinear Instrumental Variables Estimation 12
from 1, we increase the degree of nonlinearity. At 1 = 2 = 1, the marginal eects
are constant and the linear model is correctly specied. In Case 1, we then have that
(OLS) = (z1) = (z2) = 1. In Case 2, however, the positive 1; and 2; creates an
upward bias in the linear OLS estimate. For example, if 1 = 2 = 1, then (OLS) = 1:63
rather than 1.
Figure 1 illustrates Case 1. This gure shows that as we move 2 away from 1 and
introduce nonlinearity in the treatment eects, the three estimators diverge from each
other. The reason is that the estimators weigh the marginal eects dierently. On the one
hand, the linear OLS estimator places about 46 percent weight on the 1 marginal eect
and 54 percent weight on the 2 marginal eect. On the other hand, the two IV estimators
have substantially dierent weighting of the marginal eects, reecting the strength of
the instruments on each treatment margin. In our simulation, z1i is constructed to aect
mainly the rst treatment margin, while instrument z2i aects exclusively the second
margin. Given these particular instruments, the linear IV estimator using instrument z1i
places 2/3 weight on 1 and 1/3 weight on 2. In comparison, the linear IV estimator
using instrument z2i places 0 weight on 1 and all weight on 2. For this reason (z1) is
the attest line in Figure 1 as this linear estimator has relatively little weight placed on
2, while (z2) is a much steeper line as this linear estimator weighs 2 more heavily.
3.2 Testing for Treatment Eects
Consider using IV estimation to test for whether the treatment has any eect on the
outcome. The relevant null hypothesis is that each marginal eect is zero: s = 0 for all
s. Suppose we follow the previous literature in using the linear IV estimator (z) from
(3) to test this null hypothesis.
There are two cases. In the rst case, the null hypothesis is false and at least one of
the marginal eects are non-zero: s 6= 0 for some s. Under-rejection of the false null
hypothesis occurs when (z) = 0 and we fail to reject the false null hypothesis of no
treatment eect. One possibility for under-rejection is when the linear IV estimands of
the marginal eects are non-monotonic and cancel each other out. In fact, the linear IV
estimate can suggest no treatment eect even if all marginal eects are non-zero. Figure 1
presents an example of this case. For the linear IV estimator using z1 as the instrument,
(z1) = 0 when 2 =  2. In this case, the linear estimator is zero, even though both
marginal treatment eects are non-zero.
Another possibility for under-rejection occurs when the IV weights associated with
non-zero marginal eects are zero. Considering again the example in Figure 1. When
2 = 0, the linear IV estimator using z2 indicates a zero treatment eect, despite the
non-zero marginal eect at the 0 to 1 margin. The reason is that the instrument z2 only
a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2.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 13
In the second case, the null hypothesis is true and over-rejection would have occurred
if (z) 6= 0. However, under the true null hypothesis, the linear IV estimator correctly
imposes the constant marginal treatment eects restriction. As a consequence, the bias
in using linear IV estimators when the marginal eects are non-constant is one-sided, and
can only lead to under-rejection of the null hypothesis of no treatment eect.
3.3 Testing for Selection Bias
Following Hausman (1978), a standard test of selection bias is to compare the linear OLS
and IV estimates. The idea is that if the regressor of interest is exogenous, the OLS
and IV estimates would dier only by sampling error. For example, Caceres-Delpiano's
(2006) study of family size eects and children's outcomes concludes that \the two-stage
least-squares estimates are statistically distinguishable from OLS estimates, indicating
an omitted variables bias in the single equation model" (p. 738). In the general case
of treatment eect heterogeneity, the linear OLS and IV estimators can dier even if
there is no selection bias, because the LATE identies the average treatment eect of the
subgroup of individuals aected by the particular instrument chosen. As shown below,
however, even with homogeneous treatment eects the Hausman test for selection bias
can be misleading if the marginal eects are non-constant.
Consider testing the null hypothesis that there is no selection bias, which we can write
as s = 0 for all s. As before, suppose we use linear OLS and IV estimators to test
the null hypothesis. We reject the null hypothesis if (OLS) 6= (z), and fail to reject
otherwise. The dierence between the linear estimand (5) and the linear IV estimand (3)
is
(OLS)   (z) =
 s X
s=1
ws(OLS)s(OLS)   ws(z)s: (7)
There are two cases. In the rst case, the null hypothesis is true and s(OLS) = s
for all s. Over-rejection of the true null hypothesis occurs when (OLS)   (z) 6= 0. If
the marginal eects are constant (s =  for all s) or the OLS and IV weights assigned to
non-constant marginal eects are the same (ws(OLS) ws(z) = 0), then (OLS) = (z)
and the Hausman test is a valid test of selection bias. However, in the general case of
non-constant marginal eects, (OLS) may dier from (z) even without selection bias
if the OLS and IV weights are dierent: ws(OLS)   ws(z) 6= 0 for some s. Intuitively,
the Hausman test over-rejects the null hypothesis because it confuses selection bias with
dierences in the linear OLS and IV estimators due to dierent weighting of non-constant
marginal eects.
Figure 1 presents an example of this case. Recall that this gure is constructed from a
simulation imposing the null hypothesis of no selection bias. When the linear model is cor-
rect (1 = 2 = 1), the linear OLS and IV estimators provide the same estimate. However,
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the marginal eects. To provide a sense of the over-rejection that is possible given non-
linear treatment eects, we estimate for each instrument the p-value of the Hausman test
for selection bias. Figure 2 plots the average p-values across the 500 replications of the
data generating process, where we have normalized the p-value when the linear model is
correct at 1.11 This gure illustrates that the p-value for the Hausman selection bias test
falls as we increase the degree of nonlinearity. As we move away from the linear model,
the fall in the p-value indicates that we are over-rejecting the true null hypothesis of no
selection bias. The graph of p-values suggests that even modest degrees of nonlinearity
can change the probability of rejection of this commonly used test for selection bias.
Next, consider a second case in which the null hypothesis is false and there is selection
bias: s(OLS) 6= s for at least one s. Under-rejection occurs when (OLS) = (z),
which means that selection bias at dierent treatment margins oset each other. Figure 3
presents an example of this case, graphing the three linear estimators under selection
bias: Cov(dsi;i) 6= 0 for s = 1;2. As described above, we have constructed positive
selection bias which shifts the linear OLS estimate up. In Figure 3, the linear OLS
estimator intersects with each of the linear IV estimators. For this simulation, the linear
IV estimator using instrument z1 is equal to the linear OLS estimator, (z1) = (OLS),
when 2 =  2. In comparison, (z2) = (OLS) when 2 = 2:5. These two intersection
points indicate under-rejection of the null hypothesis, as the linear OLS and linear IV
estimators are equal even though the level of treatment is endogenously determined.
In Figure 4, we provide the relative p-values for this simulation. Because the two linear
IV estimators are equal to the linear OLS estimate at dierent degrees of nonlinearity,
the peak of the p-value graphs is in dierent locations on the 2 axis. Notice that for
the linear estimator using z1, values of 2 < 1 lead to under-rejection of the false null
hypothesis and higher p-values than at the point where the linear model is correct. An
interesting aspect of this gure is that the p-value for the selection bias test falls below
the level for the linear model at some points along the 2 axis. This is because at some
values of 2, both the selection bias and the nonlinearities push the linear IV estimators
away from the linear OLS estimators.
To judge to what extent linear OLS and IV estimates dier because of dierent weight-
ing of marginal eects, we propose a diagnostic tool that compares an IV-weighted OLS
estimator, dened as (OLS;z) =
P s
s=1 ws(z)s(OLS), to the linear IV estimator. The
dierence between the IV-weighted OLS estimand and the IV estimand is given by




If the null hypothesis of no selection bias holds, i.e. s = 0 for all s, then (OLS;z) =
11The level of the p-value is not informative for this simulation example since it can be manipulated
by changing the sample size or the degree of dispersion in the data.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 15
(z). Hence, by re-weighting the OLS estimator, we no longer confuse selection bias
with dierences in the OLS and IV estimators due to dierent weighting of non-constant
marginal eects. An attractive aspect of this diagnostic tool is that it does not involve
IV estimation of marginal eects, which may be dicult in practice because of too few or
too weak instruments. All that is needed is to compute the weights underlying the linear
IV estimator and estimate the marginal eects using OLS.
3.4 Testing for Instrument Invalidity
If the researcher has more instruments than included endogenous regressors, Hausman
(1978) proposed an over-identication test for whether the additional instruments are
valid (uncorrelated with the error term). A simple form of this test is to compare the
linear IV estimator using dierent instruments.12 The idea is that if all instruments are
valid, the estimates should dier only as a result of sampling error.
A diculty in interpreting the over-identication test is that varying the instrument
shifts the weights assigned to dierent marginal eects. The dierence between the IV


















Assume that instrument zi is valid, implying that 
(z) = 0. Suppose that we want to
test the null hypothesis that instrument z0
i is also valid, 
(z0) = 0, and we use the linear
IV estimators to test this hypothesis.
There are two cases. When the null hypothesis is true, over-rejection occurs when
(z)   (z0) 6= 0. Figure 3 presents an example of this case. In this gure, instruments
z1i and z2i are both valid as they are uncorrelated with i by construction. When the
linear model is correct (2 = 1), the two linear estimates are equal: (z1) = (z2). As
we introduce nonlinearity (2 6= 1), the two linear IV estimators diverge from each other.
This illustrates that the nonlinearity can lead to the erroneous conclusion that the IV
estimates are dierent, which in the spirit of the Hausman test indicates that (at least)
one of the instruments is invalid.
Next, consider a situation where the null hypothesis is false. Figure 5 illustrates this
case. To do so, we introduce a third instrument, z3i = i + 0:01i, with i  N(0;1).
12One could also compare the IV estimator using all of the instruments versus the IV estimator omitting
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The z3i instrument is constructed to be invalid since cov(z3i;i) = 0:01V ar(i) 6= 0. In
comparison, instruments z1i and z2i are valid, constructed as in Figure 3 (Case 2, selection
bias). When the linear model is correct (1 = 2), the valid linear IV estimators are equal:
(z1) = (z2), modulo sampling error. However, because z3i is an invalid instrument, the
linear IV estimator (z3) provides a dierent estimate when the linear model is correct. As
we introduce nonlinearities (2 6= 1), the linear IV estimator using the invalid instrument
z3i intersects with the linear IV estimators using the valid instruments z1i and z2i. This
illustrates a case where the linearity restriction erroneously suggests that an instrument
is valid when in fact it is invalid.
4 Empirical Analysis
This section consider three applications with variable treatment intensity, in order to
illustrate the implications of nonlinearities in IV estimation of linear models. We use the
same data and instrument as Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Aakvik et al. (2010) in
the return to schooling application, Black et al. (2005a) in the family size application,
and Lken (2010) in the family income application. We refer to these studies for detailed
description of the data, the identication strategy, as well as of relevant institutional
details.13
4.1 Returns to Schooling Application
Research on the labor market returns to human capital has a long history in economics.
Mincer (1958, 1974) provided two theoretical motivations for a log-linear specication
between earnings and schooling, one based on the principle of compensated dierentials
and a second based on an accounting identity model of human capital formation. The two
models are economically distinct, but both lead to a log-linear specication of the earnings
equation. Under the simplifying assumptions used by Mincer, the coecient on the linear
schooling term equals the internal rate of return to schooling. This is a fundamental
economic parameter that is often used to understand individuals' choice of schooling and
assess whether public expenditure on education should be increased or decreased.14
Unfortunately, data do not support the assumptions underlying the log-linear earnings
function (see e.g. Heckman et al., 2008). In particular, there is a considerable body of
evidence suggesting higher returns to degree completion years (see e.g. Jaeger and Page,
1996). A log-linear relationship between earnings and schooling is also at odds with
more realistic models of earnings. For instance, high returns to degree completion years
13Our analysis builds on Mogstad and Wiswall (2010) in the family size application, and Lken et al.
(2010) in the family income application.
14See Heckman et al. (2008) for a detailed discussion of the interpretation of return to schooling
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are consistent with sorting models of education (Weiss, 1983), in which employers use
credentials to identify workers with desirable traits that cannot be directly observed, as
well as human capital models where lumpiness in the learning process leads to more
skill acquisition in degree years than in preceding years (Chiswick, 1973). Nevertheless,
the log-linear earnings equation continues to be applied in recent work, especially in IV
estimation where the focus has been on identifying exogenous sources of variation that
can be used as instruments for schooling. Our aim is to assess the role of the linearity
restriction in schooling for the conclusions drawn from IV estimation of the returns to
schooling.
4.1.1 Data and empirical strategy
We consider two dierent data sources. First, we use the same data and instruments as
Angrist and Krueger (1991), who were among the rst to perform IV estimation of the
return to schooling. This study was also the starting point for later research on weak
instruments and population heterogeneity in the marginal eects of schooling.15 While
these issues are important, our focus is on illustrating the importance of the linearity
restriction in IV estimation of the return to schooling.16 As in Angrist and Krueger
(1991), our sample consists of 247,199 full-time employed males who were aged 40-49
in the 1970 US Census. In line with this study, we use log earnings as the dependent
variable. As an exogenous source to variation in schooling, we follow Angrist and Krueger
(1991) in using the individual's quarter of birth since individuals born later in a year are
obliged to stay in school longer due to compulsory school laws. Specically, we use their
full set of instruments: 3 quarter of birth dummy variables interacted with 10 year of
birth indicators (30 total instruments). We also use the same set of covariates as Angrist
and Krueger, which includes a quadratic specication in age (measured in quarters) as
well as dummy variables for race, marital status, region of residence, urban residence, and
year of birth.
As a second example, we use the same data and instruments as Aakvik et al. (2010).
This study explores the impact of a mandatory education reform on educational attain-
ment and returns to schooling in Norway.17 The reform extended the minimum period
of mandatory education from seven to nine years, and was implemented during a 12-year
period from 1960 to 1972. Two distinct school systems coexisted in this period, provid-
15See e.g. Staiger ant Stock (1997) for a discussion of weak instruments, and Card (2001) for a discussion
of how the instruments used have been relevant for the educational decisions of individuals with relatively
high returns to schooling. The argument is that instruments commonly used, including college proximity
and compulsory schooling laws, mostly aect the education decision of persons with relatively poor family
backgrounds, and that the return to more schooling in this subset of the population is relatively high.
16We have performed the same analysis using the data and instruments in Card (1993). The results
are very similar.
17This education reform has been used as an instrument for schooling in a number of other studies,
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ing a natural experiment in which some municipalities provided nine years of mandatory
schooling, while others provided only seven years. Aakvik et al. (2010) specify a general-
ized Roy model in the context of a control function framework with eight dierent types
of education levels. To deal with selection bias, they use the following set of instruments:
i) a reform indicator variable for the mandatory schooling reform, ii) interaction terms
between the reform dummy and the pre-reform availability of other types of schools (vo-
cational schools, upper secondary schools, regional colleges, and universities), and (iii)
interaction terms between the reform dummy and family background variables (father's
and mother's income in 1970 in quartiles, and the father's and mother's education repre-
sented by a dummy variable indicating whether they have college degrees). In our analysis,
we use the same set of instruments. We also follow Aakvik et al. (2010) in controlling for
cohort and municipality xed eects as well as family background characteristics. The
population of study consists of more than 220,000 males who were born in the years 1947-
1958. Our dependent variable is log annual earnings in 1995 (excluding observations with
zero earnings). Unlike Aakvik et al. (2010), we use a standard IV approach (rather than
a control function framework), and dene schooling as a continuous variable (instead of
using the eight-level categorization). In doing so, we conform to most previous studies
using an IV approach to address the issue of selection bias when estimating the returns
to schooling.
4.1.2 Results
We rst replicate the results of Angrist and Krueger (1991), using their log-linear speci-
cation in earnings. The linearly restricted OLS estimate suggests a 7.01 percent return
to schooling, and the linearly restricted IV estimate implies a 10.07 percent return to
schooling. In both cases, the estimates are statistically signicant from zero at the 5
percent condence level.
To interpret the linear estimates, Figure 6 graphs the linear OLS and IV weights. These
weights are constructed taking into account the covariates and multiple instruments, as
discussed above. We see that the linear IV estimator places the most weight on high
school grades, the margins from 11-12 and 12-13 years of school, mirroring that the
source to exogenous variation in schooling is the compulsory schooling law. However, the
instrument does not isolate just these particular margins. In fact, the quarter of birth
instruments assign considerable weight to the marginal eects in the upper part of the
schooling distribution. For instance, over 1/3 of the total weight is placed on the 13-14th
and higher schooling margins, and 16 percent of the total weight is assigned to the 15-16th
and higher schooling margins. Consequently, it is not clear what we can learn from the
linear IV estimate, as it is a weighted average of marginal eects that may be of quite
dierent magnitude.18
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From Figure 6, we also see that the linear IV estimator assigns negative weights to
a few of the low schooling margins (0-1, 1-2, and 2-3). The negative weighing suggests
a violation of the monotonicity assumption. Even though the negative weights are of
relatively little quantitative importance since the weights are small in absolute value, the
results serves as an example of how linear IV estimators may assign negative weights to
marginal eects.
A standard test of selection bias is to compare OLS and IV estimates from a linear
model. In our case, the IV estimate is more than 40 percent higher than the OLS esti-
mate (although the IV estimate is too imprecisely estimated to reject that they are the
same). As discussed above, the dierence between linear OLS and IV estimates might
be attributable to dierent weighting of marginal eects, rather than selection bias. To
examine this, it is useful to compare the linear OLS and IV weights displayed in Figure
6. We see that the distribution of weights are surprisingly similar. To judge more pre-
cisely to what extent linear the linear OLS and IV estimates dier because of dierent
weighting of marginal eects, we compute the IV-weighted OLS estimate, dened by (8).
The IV-weighted OLS estimate is equal to 0:0714, conrming that the dierence between
linear OLS and IV estimates is not driven by dierent weighting of marginal eects.
Next, we explore the possibility of nonlinearities in marginal eects by specifying a non-
parametric model in schooling, as in (2). Specically, we replace the linear specication of
schooling with dummy variables for all 18 distinct schooling margins (0 1 year, 1 2 year,
etc.), and re-estimate the OLS returns to schooling. Figure 7 plots the OLS estimates of
the marginal eects, along with 95 percent condence intervals. For sake of comparison,
we also include the linearly restricted OLS estimate of the marginal eect, which is a at
line at 7 percent. With this large sample of close to a quarter million observations, we are
able to precisely estimate most of the schooling margins after the 8-9 years of schooling
margin. The pattern of estimates is bimodal, with high returns to degree completion years.
The 13th year of schooling (high school completion) has a marginal return of 11 percent,
and the marginal return to the 16th year is as high as 20 percent (college completion).
In contrast, the marginal return to most other margins are around 5 percent or less. Our
nding of strong nonlinearities in the OLS estimates conform to a considerable body of
evidence suggesting higher returns to degree completion years
Next, we turn to examining how fragile the IV estimates are to relaxing the linearity
restriction in schooling. For sake of comparison, the rst row of Table 1 repeats the IV
estimate from the log-linear model, whereas the next three rows reports the IV results
schooling margins may also give some cause for concern about the validity of the instrument. Angrist
and Krueger (1991) examine this issue by using quarter of birth to predict college attendance and other
later education outcomes. They argue that the weak and imprecise correlation between quarter of birth
and these outcomes support the validity of the instrument. However, our results illustrate that the linear
IV estimator places considerable weight on these higher margins. The concern for instrument validity
revealed by this decomposition is that the weighting on the higher margins might be due to some some
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from more exible parametric models, all of which nest the log-linear model. In the second
row, we specify earnings as a quadratic function of schooling, and instrument for both
the linear and squared schooling variables. In this case, the IV estimates become too
imprecise to reject the hypothesis that there is a zero return to schooling at the 5 percent
condence level. The same holds for a number of other models that nest the log-linear
specication. While the third row species earnings as a cubic function of schooling, the
fourth row allows for nonlinearities in the relationship between log earnings and schooling
by adding dummy variables for high school and college completion. We have also replaced
the linear specication in schooling with dummy variables for all 18 schooling margins.
When performing IV estimation of this non-parametric model in schooling, we nd that
none of the estimated marginal eects are signicantly dierent from zero at the 5 percent
condence level. The fragility of the linearly restricted IV estimator may not be surprising
given the relatively weak correlation between the instruments and schooling, as previously
noted. Nevertheless, our results illustrate the importance of the linearity restriction to
IV estimates of the relationship between log earnings and schooling, since we are unable
to rule out a zero return to schooling when we use more exible parametric models.
In the remaining rows of Table 1, we report IV estimates from two models that restrict
the relationship between log earnings and schooling to be captured by a single regressor,
as in the log-linear specication. Although neither model nests the log-linear specica-
tion, they are both alternative approximations of the relationship between log earnings
and schooling that preserve the eciency gain from only having to instrument for one
endogenous regressor. The fth row replaces the linear schooling term with a squared
schooling term, and the sixth row uses a cubic schooling term instead of a linear schooling
term. The estimated coecient on the squared schooling term is statistically signicant
at the 5 percent condence level. This also holds true for the estimated coecient on the
cubic schooling term. Furthermore, it is instructive to note that both the model with a
squared schooling term and the model with a cubic schooling term have greater R-square
values than the log-linear model. Therefore, in terms of precision and model t, there
seems to be no reason to prefer a linearly restricted model in the IV estimation of the
return to schooling.
Figure 8 graphs the IV estimates from the log-linear model, the model with a squared
schooling term, and the model with a cubic schooling. As expected, we see that the
estimated returns to another year of schooling vary substantially between the models. For
example, the model with a squared schooling term suggests an 8 percent marginal return
to the 11th year of schooling, and a nearly 15 percent marginal return for completing
the 18th year of schooling. In comparison, the model with a cubic term implies a 7.3
percent marginal return to the 11th year of schooling, and almost 19.5 percent return for
completing the 18th year of schooling. These results illustrate that the choice between
dierent parametric models that generate sucient precision in the IV estimates mayLinear Instrumental Variables Estimation 21
substantially aect the conclusions drawn about the returns to schooling.
To achieve suciently precise IV estimates of models that nest the log-linear speci-
cation, we next turn to a dierent data source and instrument set taken from Aakvik et
al. (2010). Table 2 reports IV results from the alternative specications of the earnings
equations, whereas Figure 9 plots the IV estimates of the marginal eects.19 The rst
row of this table shows the results from the log-linear specication, suggesting a 14.95
percent return to schooling. In the second row, we begin exploring for the possibility
of nonlinearity in marginal eects by specifying log earnings as a quadratic function of
schooling, and instrument for both the linear and squared schooling variables. In this
case, the IV estimates are highly signicant, suggesting a decreasing concave relationship.
For example, the IV estimates suggest about 16 percent marginal return to the 11th year
of schooling and as little as 3.4 percent marginal return for completing the 18th year of
schooling. Next, the third row allows for nonlinearities in the relationship between log
earnings and schooling by adding dummy variables for high school completion.20 Also
in this case, the IV estimates are highly signicant. In particular, our results illustrate
that taking into account the relatively large return to high school completion reduces the
coecient on the linear schooling term by as much as 40 percent. Table 2 also reveals
that both the quadratic model and the model with the dummy variable at high school
completion have greater R-square values than the log-linear model. Therefore, in terms
of precision and model t, there seems to be no reason to impose the linearity restriction
in the IV estimation of the returns to schooling.
Admittedly, a more exible specication than what is used in Table 2 would likely
provide a better approximation of the empirical relationship between log earnings and
schooling. To examine this, we have performed IV estimation of less restrictive parametric
models. The estimates from these models are unfortunately too imprecise to draw any
conclusions about nonlinearities. At the very least, the specications used in the second
and third row nests the specication used in the rst row, and is therefore an improvement
over the log-linear specication employed in most previous studies.
4.1.3 Discussion
Our results demonstrate that the linearity restriction in schooling plays an important role
in the conclusion drawn about the returns to schooling. In line with previous studies,
our OLS results indicate relatively high returns to degree completion years (high school
19The linear OLS estimate indicates a 5.74 percent return to schooling. The OLS estimates of a non-
parametric model in schooling suggest a bimodal pattern, with much higher returns to degree completion
(12 and 16 years). We are able to precisely estimate the marginal eects at all schooling margins (8-18
years). The rst stage results are very strong for each model in Table 2, with F-values on the excluded
instruments around 34.
20In a similar way, Harmon and Walker (1999) allow for a change in the returns to schooling around
high school completion in their IV estimation. Their results suggest strong nonlinearities in the returns
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or college). And when allowing for a nonlinear relationship between log earnings and
schooling in the IV estimation, we nd that the estimated returns to schooling are quite
sensitive to the parametric restrictions made. The evidence of substantially dierent
marginal eects of an additional year of schooling depending on the choice of functional
form underscores that careful exploration of possible nonlinearities is of central importance
in empirical research that aims to understand individuals' choice of schooling.
Nonlinearities in the returns to schooling is also of interest from a policy perspective.
In most developed countries, government subsidies and regulations vary systematically
through the education system, from pre-school through secondary and post-secondary
levels. To understand the marginal costs and benets of these policies, it seems crucial to
have some understanding of how the return to an additional year of schooling varies with
the level of schooling. For instance, the evidence of relatively high return to high school
completion would seem to suggest that there are great benets to policies that reduce
high school completion rates.
4.2 Family Size Application
Although the seminal quantity-quality model of fertility by Becker and Lewis (1973)
assumes that family size and child quality are jointly determined, there is nothing in
the theory which suggests that the relationship is linear. On the contrary, even with no
heterogeneity in the production function of child quality, there can be nonlinearities in
child quality from changes in family size (Mogstad and Wiswall, 2010). This is because
parental preferences mediate changes in family size such that an increase in the number
of children can have large or small, and negative or positive, eects on existing children.
Hence, the relationship between family size and child outcome may not only be nonlinear
but even non-monotonic.
The possibility of nonlinearities in the relationship between family size and child qual-
ity was pointed out by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), but has received little attention in
the subsequent empirical literature. Based on a linear model in family size, the pioneering
study by Black et al. (2005a) concludes that \there is little if any family size eect on
child education; this is true when we estimate the relationship with controls for birth
order [OLS] or instrument family size with twin births" (p. 697). They therefore argue
that we need to \revisit models of fertility and reconsider what should be included in the
production function of children" (p. 698).21 Motivated by the theoretical ambiguity about
the magnitude and sign of the marginal eects on child quality of additional siblings, our
point of departure is to allow for a nonlinear relationship between family size and child
outcome in the IV estimation.
21Using data from the US, Caceres-Delpiano (2006) comes to a similar conclusion. Other recent studies
reporting no eect of family size include Angrist et al. (2010) using data from Israel and Aaslund and
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4.2.1 Data and empirical strategy
As in Black et al. (2005a), our data is based on administrative registers from Statistics
Norway covering the entire resident population of Norway, who were between 16 and 74
years of age at some point during the period 1986-2000. Following Black et al. (2005a),
the sample is restricted to children who were aged at least 25 in 2000 to make it likely
that most individuals in our sample have completed their education. Conforming to Black
et al. (2005a), our measure of family size is the number of children born to each mother.
The only dierence between our sample selection and that in Black et al. (2005a) is that
we exclude a small number of families (less than 2 percent) with more than 6 children.
Our reason for excluding large families is that the estimates of the marginal family size
eects are unstable and imprecise for families with more than 6 children. The linear OLS
and IV estimates barely move when including families with 6 or more children.
Following Black et al. (2005a), we use twin births as a source of exogenous variation
in family size, conditional on the same set of controls for children's birth order and other
characteristics.22 The rationale for using twins as instruments is that for some families,
twin births increase the number of siblings beyond the desired family size. In our sample,
a twin birth occurs in around 1.4 percent of families.
The main empirical model used in the family size literature species outcomes for
children as a linear function of their family size, as in (1). Our point of departure is
to specify a non-parametric model in family size by including dummy variables for each
number of siblings, as in (2). To avoid including the endogenously selected outcomes
of children born after the twin birth as well as of twins themselves, we follow Black et
al. (2005a) in restricting the sample to rst born children in families with 2 or more
children. In the IV estimation of the linear model, the instrument for family size is a
dummy variable for whether the second birth was a twin birth (implying that the second
and third born children are twins). When performing IV estimation of the non-parametric
model in family size, there are four endogenous marginal family size variables that need to
be instrumented for. Following Mogstad and Wiswall (2010), our strategy is to use twins
at second, third, fourth, and fth birth as instruments for the four endogenous dummy
variables: 2 or more, 3 or more, 4 or more, and 5 or more siblings.
4.2.2 Results
As in Black et al. (2005a), OLS on the linear model yields a precisely estimated eect of
family size on children's education that is very close to zero. However, the OLS estimates
of the non-parametric model in family size reveal an inverse U-shaped pattern, with
family size eects that are always statistically signicant (at 5 percent level) and often
22Following Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), twin births have been frequently used as an exogenous
shock to family size. See for example Black et al. (2005a) for results supporting the internal validity of
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sizeable. Figure 10 graphs the predicted average child education from the OLS estimation
of the linear and non-parametric model in family size. The gure presents educational
attainment relative to only children, whose average educational attainment is normalized
to 0. The slopes in this gure are the marginal eect estimates. Contrasting the estimates
from the two types of models indicates the extent to which OLS estimation of the linear
model approximates the relationship between child education and family size.
Examining Figure 10, we see a stark contrast between the estimates from the linear
and non-parametric models in family size. While the linear OLS estimate is as small as
0.0001, the non-parametric results suggest that having one sibling increases educational
attainment of rst born by as much as 0:245 years. In contrast, adding a third sibling is
estimated to reduce educational attainment of rst born children by 0:086 years, adding
a fourth sibling reduces education an additional 0:157 years, and adding a fth sibling
reduces education an additional 0:107 years.
Table 3 presents IV and OLS results for the linear model in family size in Panel I and
the non-parametric models in family size in Panel II, when restricting the sample to rst
born children from families with 2 or more children. The strong rst stage results are
reported in Mogstad and Wiswall (2010). The rst column of Panel I shows a linear eect
of family size that is insignicant and close to zero, as in Black et al. (2005a). Turning
attention to the IV results of the non-parametric model in family size, reported in the
rst column of Panel II in Table 3, the main nding is that there are signicant and large
marginal family size eects on children's education. Furthermore, the results indicate a
non-monotonic causal relationship between family size and children's education. On the
one hand, a third child is estimated to increase completed education by 0.15 years. On
the other hand, changes in family size are estimated to reduce children's education by
0.47 years for a fourth child, another 0.8 years for a fth child, and an additional 0.79
years for a sixth child. It should be noted that these marginal family size eects exceed
the birth order eects that Black et al. (2005a) emphasize as large.
Both the OLS and IV results suggest that the linear model does a poor job approxi-
mating the relationship between child education and family size. However, as discussed
above, a linear model will nevertheless produce some weighted average of the underlying
marginal eects. The question is how the linear estimates should be interpreted, and
what policy questions they could answer. For instance, if having twins on second birth
only aects the probability of having 3 instead of 2 children, then IV estimation of the
linearly restricted model would identify solely the marginal eect of moving from 2 to 3
children, which is readily interpretable. However, this is not the case. Figure 11 displays
the linear IV weights. As expected, using twins at second birth as the instrument weights
the 2 to 3 children margin most heavily (76 percent), but also places considerable weight
on the marginal eects at higher parities (24 percent). Consequently, it is not clear what
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several marginal eects, which vary in sign and magnitude.
Figure 11 also shows that the distribution of OLS and IV weights are quite dierent.
While the linear OLS estimator places 44 percent weight on the 1-2 child margin, the linear
IV estimator places 76 percent of the weight on this marginal eect. As discussed above,
a standard test of selection bias is to compare OLS and IV estimates from a linear model.
By comparing the linear IV estimate (-0.0036) to the linear OLS estimate (-0.063), we see
that the point estimates dier, although the IV estimate is too imprecisely estimated to
reject that they are the same. By comparing the IV-weighted OLS estimate (-0.032) to
the linear IV estimate (-0.0036), we learn that as much as half of the dierence between
the OLS and IV estimates is a result of dierent weighting of the marginal eects.
4.2.3 Discussion
Our results demonstrate that the conclusion of no family size eect is an artifact of a linear
specication in family size, masking substantial marginal family size eects. This is true
when we perform OLS estimation with controls for confounding characteristics such as
birth order, or instrument family size with twin birth. In terms of the quantity-quality
model, the estimated marginal eects can be interpreted as suggesting a tradeo between
quantity and quality in large families, and (strong) complementarities between quantity
and quality in small families.
The nding of a nonlinear relationship between family size and children's outcomes
is also of interest from a policy perspective. Most developed countries have a range of
policies aecting fertility decisions, including publicly provided or subsidized child care
as well as welfare and tax policies, such as maternity leave laws, family allowances, single
parent benets, and family tax credits. In fact, families with children receive special
treatment under the tax and transfer provisions in twenty-eight of the thirty OECD
countries (OECD, 2002). Many of these policies are designed such that they reduce
the cost of having one child more than the cost of having additional children, in eect
promoting smaller families.23 If a policy goal is to slow or reverse the unprecedented
fertility decline most developed countries have experienced over the last 30 years, the
eects of family size on children's outcomes become ever more important. Accepting the
recent ndings of no eect of family size suggests that there is no need to be concerned with
the externalities on the human capital development of existing children when designing
policies promoting larger families. Our ndings run counter to this conclusion. The
23For example, welfare benets are, in many cases, reduced or even cut o after reaching a certain
number of children. In the US, a recipient of the Earned Income Tax Credit program could in 2007
receive a maximum credit of USD 2;900 if he or she had one qualifying child; for two or more qualifying
children, the maximum credit was only USD 4;700. In addition, a number of US states have implemented
family cap policies, providing little or no increase in cash benets when a child is born to a mother who
is on welfare. Some developing countries have implemented far more radical policies to promote smaller
families, such as China's One Child Policy and an aggressive public promotion of family planning in
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evidence of an inverse U-shaped pattern suggests that an ecient policy might be to
target incentives for higher fertility to small families, and discourage larger families from
having more children.
4.3 Family Income Application
The seminal model of Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) predicts an increasing concave
relationship between family income and child outcome. This is because parents with low
family income are more likely to be credit constrained and will therefore under-invest in
their children's human capital.24 The marginal return on human capital will therefore
exceed that on assets in credit constrained families. This implies that poor parents will
invest more of an increase in family income in children's human capital compared to
rich parents who would give more as bequests. The theoretical prediction of a concave
relationship is supported by the OLS estimates reported in Blau (1999) and Duncan
et al. (2009), suggesting a much stronger association between childhood family income
and child development in poor families than in rich families, both in the US and in
Norway. Yet, when performing IV estimation, child outcomes are typically restricted to
be a linear function of family income.25 Motivated by theoretical predictions and OLS
results suggesting a nonlinear relationship, we depart from previous studies in allowing
the marginal eects on children's outcomes of an increase in family income to vary across
the family income distribution.
4.3.1 Data and empirical strategy
As in Lken (2010), our data is based on administrative registers from Statistics Norway
covering the entire resident population of Norway. We also follow Lken (2010) in our
denition of family income. Income is taken from tax registers, and includes all market
income, from wages and self-employment, as well as (taxable) cash benets such as unem-
ployment benets, disability benets, and sickness pay. In every year, we add the income
of the child's mother to her spouse's income (if she has any spouse), to create one vari-
able reecting annual family income. This means that we measure family income as the
total income of the family that the child lived in, regardless of whether the spouse of the
mother is the child's biological father. We then dene family income during childhood as
24As emphasized by Cunha and Heckman (2007), there are two distinct types of credit constraints
operating on the family and its children, which can produce a nonlinear relationship between family
income and child outcome. The rst constraint is the inability of parents to borrow against their children's
future income to nance investment in them. The second constraint is the inability of parents to borrow
against their own income to nance investment in their children. See also Cunha and Heckman (2007) for
a discussion of evidence suggesting that credit constraints operating in childhood actually aect children's
ability and educational outcome as adults.
25See Shea (2000), Oreopoulos et al. (2005), Dahl and Lochner (2008), Milligan and Stabile (2007),
and Lken (2010).Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 27
the average annual family income from age 1 until age 11. We use three dierent measures
for children's outcomes: years of education, whether the individual is a high school drop
out, and an IQ test score. Years of education is dened as the number of completed years
of education in 2006, whereas high school drop out is dened as not obtaining a three
year high school diploma by 2006. Unlike these two outcome measures, the IQ test score
is only available for males, as it is collected from military records. Since military service
is mandatory for men, we have information on the IQ tests for the vast majority of males.
Conforming to Lken (2010), we use time and regional variation in the economic boom
that followed the initial (oshore) discovery of oil in Norway as a source to plausibly
exogenous variation in childhood family income. At the end of 1969, the rst major oil
discovery was made in the North Sea in Norway, and in June 1970, the public was informed
of it. Eventually, the discovery of oil fueled the entire Norwegian economy, but Rogaland
county was the rst and most strongly inuenced because the main oil production in the
relevant period was located o the coast there. The large increase in labor demand from
the oil industry gradually spilled over into higher wages also for other types of jobs. As
in Lken (2010), our sample of children is restricted to cohorts who were born in the
years prior to the initial discovery of oil in Norway, to avoid threats to the validity of the
instrument from endogenous migration. In addition, the sample is restricted to children
who were born in Rogaland county or in ten other counties that were geographically
distant from the oshore oil elds, but with similar family and child characteristics as
those in Rogaland. After these sample restrictions, we have data on more than 120,000
children.
The rationale for using the initial discovery of oil as a natural experiment is twofold.
First, the extent to which childhood family income of children born in a given year are
aected by the subsequent oil boom depends on the geographical proximity of their place
of birth to the oshore oil elds. And second, for children born in the same place, the
eect of the oil boom on childhood family income depended on their year of birth. The
instrument for family income exploits the fact that the oil boom most strongly aected the
childhood family income of children born in the years immediately before the discovery of
oil, in the county located just o the coast of the oshore oil elds. The rst and second
stage specications include xed eects for birth cohort and county of birth, controlling
for unobserved permanent dierences between children born in dierent years as well as
between children born in dierent areas. We refer to Lken (2010) and Lken et al. (2010)
for descriptive statistics as well as an in-depth discussion of the identication strategy,
including a battery of robustness checks.
The main empirical model used in the family income literature species children's
outcomes as a linear function of family income, as in (1). Our point of departure is
to relax the linearity restriction. Following Lken et al. (2010), we specify children's
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specication, we condition on the same set of controls as Lken (2010), which in addition
to the xed eects for birth cohort and county of birth includes dummy variables for
child's birth order, number of siblings, gender, parent's age and college attendance. All
the control variables are measured in the year the child is born, and therefore before our
regressor of interest, childhood family income.
In the IV estimation of the linear family income model, we rst use a single binary
instrument, equal to 1 if the child is born in Rogaland in the years 1967-1969, and 0
otherwise. However, to identify the parameters of both the linear and the squared family
income terms in the quadratic specication of family income, we need more than one in-
strument. To construct multiple instruments, we follow Lken et al. (2010) in interacting
the above binary instrument discussed with ve control variables: indicator for father
attended college, indicator for mother attended college, father's age, mother's age, and an
indicator for large family size (3 or more siblings). Next, we use the full set of instruments
in the rst stage estimations for the linear and the squared family income terms.26 To
provide a direct comparison between the IV results of the linear and quadratic model
using the same set of instruments, we also estimate the linear model with the full set of
instruments.
4.3.2 Results
Columns 1-3 of Table 4 report the linear OLS and IV estimates for our three outcome
measures: years of education, high school drop out, and IQ. From Panel I, we see that our
precise OLS results indicate a positive and sizable eect of family income on children's
educational attainment and IQ as adults. To get a perspective on the magnitude of the
parameter estimates, a standard deviation increase in family income (NOK 101,000 or
USD 17,414) is estimated to produce slightly less than 0.5 additional years of education,
a fall in high school drop out rates in the range of 5 to 6 percent, and a rise in the IQ test
score of more than 0.125 of a standard deviation. In Panel II, we report linear IV results
when using only the binary instrument in the rst stage estimation. The IV estimates
show no sign of signicant eects of family income on child outcome, although they are
too imprecisely estimated to rule out some eect.
As discussed above, the interpretation and comparison of the linear estimates reported
26A number of previous studies have used this strategy to improve the precision of their IV estimates.
The strategy exploits the fact that if the main instrument is valid and the included covariates are ex-
ogenous (a necessary assumption for consistent IV estimation of the linear model), then any function of
the main instrument and the included covariates are valid instruments. Our reason for not interacting
the Rogaland dummy variable with all the included control variables is that such a procedure would
introduce a large number of over-identifying restrictions, which could increase the small sample bias of
the IV estimator (see e.g. Staiger and Stock, 1997). Even though our rst stage results are strong, we will
therefore interact the Rogaland dummy variable with only ve control variables. The reason for choosing
these control variables is that they generate the strongest rst stage results. We have also veried that
our results are robust to performing IV estimation using only subsets of these interactions, as well when
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in Table 4 depend on the relationship between family income and child outcomes being
linear or that the weights attached to the marginal eects are similar across the linear
estimators. To directly examine the weighting implicit in the linear estimators, Figure 13
displays the OLS and IV weights. In order to compute the weights, we have discretized
the income distribution using intervals of the family income distribution of length NOK
25,000 (USD 4,310). We see that the linear IV estimate assigns relatively little weight to
the marginal eects at the lower part of the family income distribution, illustrating that
the oil boom did not do that much for the family income of poor families. In comparison,
the linear OLS estimator weights the dierent margins more evenly than the linear IV
estimator. In particular, the OLS estimator assigns several times more weight to marginal
eects in the lower part of the family income distribution than the linear IV estimator.
This evidence of substantially dierent weighting of the marginal eects of family income
underscores that we need to be cautious when interpreting and comparing the results
from these linear estimators.
To directly test whether functional form assumptions drive the conclusions drawn
about the causal relationship between family income and child outcome, we specify chil-
dren's outcomes as a quadratic function of family income, with a linear and a squared
family income term. Table 4 reports OLS and IV results from the quadratic specica-
tion in family income. The strong rst stage results are reported in Lken et al. (2010).
Panel IV reports the OLS results, whereas Panel V reports IV results using the full set
of instruments in the rst stage estimations. Our main nding is that all of the results
suggest a concave relationship between family income and children's outcomes, with large
marginal eects at the lower parts of the family income distribution. This holds true for
both the OLS and IV results.
Although the full set of instruments are valid under the same assumptions as the bi-
nary instrument, they will in general identify dierent LATEs. Panel III therefore reports
IV results from the linear model, using the same instruments as used in the IV estimates
of the quadratic model, reported in Panel V. Comparing the results from the linear and
quadratic specication using the same set of instruments, it is clear the role of the linearity
restriction in masking the family income eects. The linear IV estimates are never sig-
nicantly dierent, and always insignicantly dierent from zero, whereas the quadratic
IV estimates using the same set of instruments show large and quite precisely estimated
eects of family income. Hence, we can conclude that for a given set of instruments, the
second stage restriction plays an important role in the conclusion of the eects of family
income on child outcome.
It should nally be noted that our quadratic specication is intended to achieve a rea-
sonable tradeo between exibility in functional form and achieving sucient precision.
We have, however, performed OLS estimation with higher order polynomials in family
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marginal eect estimates over the majority of the family income distribution. We have
also performed the IV estimation with a cubic term in family income. The coecients
associated with the cubic term are always insignicant, indicating that the concave spec-
ication might not be too bad. However, we admittedly cannot rule out that an even
more exible specication would provide a better approximation of the empirical rela-
tionship. At the very least, our quadratic model nests the linear model, and is therefore
an improvement over the linear specication used in previous studies.
To examine whether a simple transformation of the family income variable is sucient
to capture the nonlinear relationship, we have also performed OLS and IV estimation
with child outcome specied as a linear function of log family income. We nd, like in
Dahl and Lochner (2008), that measuring family income in logs rather than levels does
not change our main results: The linearly restricted OLS estimates stay signicant and
substantial, whereas the linear IV estimates remain insignicant and closer to zero.
4.3.3 Discussion
When allowing for a nonlinear relationship between family income and child outcome, our
IV results support the predictions from the seminal model of Becker and Tomes (1979,
1986) of an increasing concave relationship. In fact, the estimated marginal eects at the
lower part of the family income distribution are several orders of magnitude larger than
the marginal eects at the middle and upper part of the family income distribution. In
contrast, the linear IV estimate suggests little, if any, eect of family income, because
they assign little weight to the large marginal eects at the lower part of the income
distribution. This illustrates how the conclusions drawn about the empirical content of
an economic theory may depend on the chosen functional form in the IV estimation.
Our results may also be of interest from a policy perspective. Most developed coun-
tries have a range of policies targeted at family income during childhood, such as family
allowances, maternity benets, single parent benets, and family tax credits. While some
of these policies are means-tested, others are more universal of nature. The evidence of
a concave relationship between family income and child outcomes, with relatively large
positive eect at the lower part of the family income distribution, indicates that policies
targeting poor families may be quite eective in promoting child development.
5 Conclusion
Mainstream economic theory postulates that the behavior of economic agents are deter-
mined by comparing benets and costs that result from marginal changes. Similarly, to
determine the optimal level of a public policy, voters or government ocials must compare
the marginal bene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empirical studies often use a linear IV estimator, in which the dependent variable is spec-
ied as a linear function of a potentially endogenous regressor. When this regressor takes
on multiple values, the linear specication restricts the marginal eects to be constant
across all margins
In this paper, we examine the implications for inference from using a linear IV estima-
tor when the true relationship is nonlinear. Previous research has shown that the linear
OLS and IV estimands can be decomposed into weighted averages of marginal eects
estimates, where the OLS and IV weights generally dier. Using such decompositions,
the rst part of the paper examines the biases due to nonlinearity in commonly used tests
for treatment eects, selection bias, and instrument validity.
To demonstrate that the implications of the linearity restriction in IV estimation are
not merely theoretical peculiarities but real cause for concern, the second part of the
paper considers three applications with variable treatment intensity: the economic return
to schooling, the link between family size and child quality, and the eect of childhood
family income on child development. The choice of applications is not incidental. In all
three cases, economic theory and OLS results suggest a nonlinear relationship between
the dependent variable and the regressor of interest, yet previous research has typically
used linearly restricted IV estimators. In each application, we nd that the IV estimates
are not robust to relaxing the linearity restriction. In particular, allowing for a more
exible functional form changes the qualitative conclusions about the relevant economic
theory and the eectiveness of dierent policies.
A general lesson to be drawn from this paper is that the linearity restriction in IV
estimation may drive the conclusions reached in applications with variable treatment
intensity. This nding stands in stark contrast to Angrist and Pischke (2010), who argue
that the linearity restriction gives little cause for concern. Rather, our ndings echo the
argument of Leamer (1983) and others that exploration of possible nonlinearities is of
central importance in empirical research, especially when it comes to testing theory and
assessing policy.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 32
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6 Figures
Figure 1: Linear IV and OLS Estimates in the Case without Selection Bias





























Linear IV using z1
Linear IV using z2
Linear Estimate of β = 0
Notes: This gure illustrates how nonlinearities aect OLS and IV estimates of a linear model. The
underlying model is yi = 1d1i+2d2i+i, where the rst marginal eect is xed at 1 = 1. The vertical
axis measures the level of one of three linear estimators: linear OLS, (OLS), linear IV using z1 as an
instrument, (z1), and linear IV using an z2, (z2). The horizontal axis measures 2. At 2 = 1 = 1, the
linear model is correct and the marginal eects are constant. This gure is drawn assuming no selection
bias. Therefore, when the linear model is correct, all three estimators are equal: (OLS) = (z1) = (z2),
modulo sampling error. As 2 moves away from 2 = 1, the three estimators diverge from each other due
to their dierent weighting of the marginal eects.
Source: Simulation from data generating process, described in Section 3.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 37
Figure 2: Relative P-Value for Test of No Selection Bias in the Case without Selection
Bias
































P−Value for Selection Test using z1
P−Value for Selection Test using z2
Notes: This gure is based on Figure 1. It provides the P-Value from two tests of no selection bias:
H0 : (OLS)   (z1) = 0 using z1 as the instrument; H0 : (OLS)   (z2) = 0 using z2 as the
instrument.
Source: Simulation from data generating process, described in Section 3.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 38
Figure 3: Linear IV and OLS Estimators in the Case with Selection Bias





























Linear IV using z1
Linear IV using z2
Zero Estimate
Notes: This gure illustrates how nonlinearities aect OLS and IV estimates of a linear model. The
underlying model is yi = 1d1i+2d2i+i, where the rst marginal eect is xed at 1 = 1. The vertical
axis measures the level of one of three linear estimators: linear OLS, (OLS), linear IV using z1 as an
instrument, (z1), and linear IV using an z2, (z2). The vertical axis measures 2. At 2 = 1 = 1,
the linear model is correct and the marginal eects are constant. This gure assumes positive selection
bias, and as a consequence (OLS) > (z). However, because the treatment eects are constructed to
be homogeneous, when the linear model is correct, the linear IV estimators are equal: (z1) = (z2),
modulo sampling error. As 2 moves away from 2 = 1, the linear IV estimators diverge from each other
due to their dierent weighting of the marginal eects.
Source: Simulation from data generating process, described in Section 3.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 39
Figure 4: Relative P-Value for Test of No Selection Bias in the Case with Selection Bias



























P−Value for Selection Test using z1 P−Value for Selection Test using z2
Notes: This gure is based on Figure 3. It provides the P-Value from two tests of no selection bias:
H0 : (OLS)   (z1) = 0 using z1 as the instrument; H0 : (OLS)   (z2) = 0 using z2 as the
instrument.
Source: Simulation from data generating process, described in Section 3.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 40
Figure 5: Comparison of Linear IV Estimators (z1i;z2i valid, z3i invalid)





























Linear IV using z3 (invalid IV)
Linear IV using z1 (valid IV)
Linear IV using z2 (valid IV)
Notes: This gure illustrates how nonlinearities aect the over-identication test estimates of a linear
model. We use the same model as in Figure 3, except for adding a third instrument constructed to be
invalid: z3i = i + 0:01i, with i  N(0;1). When the linear model is correct (1 = 2), the linear IV
estimators using the valid instruments z1 and z2 are equal, but the linear IV estimator using the invalid
instrument z3 dierent: (z1) = (z2) 6= (z3), modulo sampling error. As 2 moves away from 2 = 1,
the linear IV estimator using z3 intersects with the linear IV estimators using z1 and z2.
Source: Simulation from data generating process, described in Section 3.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 41



























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Linear IV Weight, Qtr of Birth Linear OLS Weight
Notes: This table reports the weights for the linear OLS and IV estimates. To compute these weights,
we use the decomposition described in Section 2. The decomposition adjusts for multiple instruments
and covariates. The margins are labeled such that margin 1 is the schooling margin from 0 to 1 years of
schooling, margin 2 is from 1 to 2 years of schooling, and so on.
Source: 1970 US Census data from Angrist and Krueger (1991).Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 42










0 5 10 15 20
Schooling Margin
Non−Parameteric OLS Estimate Linear OLS Estimate
Upper 95% CI Lower 95% CI
Notes: This gure graphs the estimated marginal eects from the log-linear and non-parametric in years
of schooling, based on OLS regressions. Each model includes a full set of covariates.
Source: 1970 US Census data from Angrist and Krueger (1991).Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 43






































0 5 10 15 20
Schooling Margin
Linear in Schooling IV Quadratic in Schooling IV
Cubic in Schooling IV
Notes: This gure graphs the estimated marginal eects based on the IV estimates reported in the rst
(log-linear), fth (squared), and sixth (cubed) row of Table 1.
Source: 1970 US Census data from Angrist and Krueger (1991) including only men aged 40-49.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 44
Figure 9: Returns to Schooling Application, Aakvik et al. (2010): IV estimates of
marginal eects
Notes: This gure graphs the estimated marginal eects based on the IV estimates reported in the rst
(log-linear), second (quadratic), and third (Linear and dummy) row of Table2. Source: 1970 US Census
data from Angrist and Krueger (1991) including only men aged 40-49.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 45
Figure 10: Family Size Application: Average Educational Attainment for First Born




































Notes: This gure graphs the linear and non-parametric in family size predictions from OLS regressions.
The sample consists of rst born children in families with 2 or more children. Each model includes a full
set of covariates. The values are graphed relative to only children (0 siblings), i.e. the education of only
children is normalized to 0. The slopes in this gure provide the estimated marginal family size eects at
each margin, where the linear model imposes constant slopes whereas the non-parametric model allows
non-constant slopes. The marginal eect estimate from the linear model is close to zero (represented by a
at line), while the non-parametric estimate of the marginal eects indicates that they are non-monotonic.
The linear prediction of total eect is ^ y = ^   S for S = 0;1;:::;5, where S is number of siblings and
^  is the OLS estimate from the linear model in family size. Non-parametric prediction of total eect is
^ y = ^ 1  1fs  1g +  + ^ 5  1fs = 6g, where ^ s are the OLS estimates from the non-parametric model
in family size.
Source: Administrative registers from Statistics Norway.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 46
Figure 11: Family Size Application: Linear OLS and IV Weights
Notes: This gure reports the weights for the linear OLS and IV estimates displayed in Table 3. To
compute these weights, we use the decompositions described in Section 2.
Source: Administrative registers from Statistics Norway.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 47
Figure 12: Family Income Application: OLS Estimates of Marginal Eects on Years of
Education
 
Notes: This gure graphs OLS estimates of marginal eects from a linear specication in family income,
a quadratic specication in family income, and cubic specication in family income. A full set of controls
is used in all regressions.
Source: Administrative registers from Statistics Norway.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 48
Figure 13: Family Income Application: Linear OLS and IV weights
 
Notes: This table reports the weights for the linear OLS and IV estimates displayed in Table4. To
compute these weights, we use the decomposition described in Section 2.
Source: Administrative registers from Statistics Norway.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 49
7 Tables
Table 1: Return to Schooling Application, Angrist and Krueger (1991): IV estimates from
Alternative Models
Linear Squared Cubed High School College R2
Model si s2
i s3
i 1fsi  12g 1fsi  16g
Log-Linear 0.1007 0.2065
(0.0336)
Quadratic 0.1080 -0.00032 0.2052
(0.1366) (0.0058)
Cubic 0.9075 -0.0848 0.0027 0.0506
(0.4734) (0.0478) (0.0015)
Linear and 0.1382 -0.3439 0.0646 0.1766





Notes: This table reports IV estimates of six dierent models of schooling. The rst row species log
earnings as a linear function of schooling. The next three rows nest the log-linear model. The second
row species log earnings as a quadratic function of schooling, including a linear and a squared schooling
term. The third row species log earnings as a cubic function of schooling, including linear, squared,
and cubed schooling terms. The fourth row species log earnings as a linear function of schooling, with
dummy variables at high school and college completion. The last two rows are non-nested alternatives to
the log-linear model. The fth row replaces the linear schooling term with a quadratic schooling term.
The sixth row replaces the linear schooling term with a cubed schooling term. A full set of controls is
used in all specications. In each rst stage, a full set of instruments is used (3 quarter of birth dummy
variables interacted with 10 birth indicators). Standard errors in parentheses are heteroschedastic robust.
Source: 1970 US Census data from Angrist and Krueger (1991).Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 50
Table 2: Return to Schooling Application, Aakvik et al. (2010): IV estimates from
Alternative Models
Linear Squared High School R2
Model si s2
i 1fsi  12g
Log-Linear 0.1495 0.0831
(0.0060)
Quadratic 0.3567 -0.0084 0.1059
(0.0830) (0.0034)
Linear and 0.0893 0.3867 0.1161
dummy (0.0189) (0.1310)
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of three dierent models of schooling. The rst row species log
earnings as a linear function of schooling. The second row species log earnings as a quadratic function of
schooling, including a linear and a squared schooling term. The third row species log earnings as a linear
function of schooling, with a linear schooling term and a dummy variable at high school completion. A
full set of controls is used in all specications. In each rst stage, a full set of instruments is used (reform
indicator, interaction terms between reform indicator and the pre-reform availability of other types of
school, and interaction terms between the reform indicator and family background variables). Standard
errors in parentheses are heteroscedastic robust.
Source: Administrative registers from Statistics Norway.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 51
Table 3: Family Size Application: OLS and IV Estimates from the Linear and Non-
Parametric Models in Family Size
Panel I: Linear Estimates of Marginal Eects
IV OLS
Numb. of Children -0.0036 -0.063
(0.0460) (0.004)
Panel II: Non-Parametric Estimates of Marginal Eects
Marginal eect IV OLS
Siblings 0.153 -0.0127
 2 (0.063) (0.008)
Siblings -0.474 -0.079
 3 (0.079) (0.011)
Siblings -0.800 -0.151
 4 (0.129) (0.019)
Siblings -0.787 -0.102
 5 (0.247) (0.033)
Notes: This table reports the OLS and IV estimates of marginal eects from the linear and non-parametric
models in family size. The sample consists of rst born children in families with 2 or more children. Each
column is separate regression. Siblings  2 is the marginal eect from moving from 1 to 2 siblings,
Siblings  3 is the marginal eect from moving from 2 to 3 siblings, and so on. All models include a
full set of covariates, and twin births are used as the instrument for family size. Standard errors are
heteroscedastic robust.
Source: Administrative registers from Statistics Norway.Linear Instrumental Variables Estimation 52
Table 4: Family Income Application: OLS and IV Estimates of the Linear and Quadratic




Panel I: Linear OLS
Family income in 10000 NOK .043 -.006 .028
(.001) (.000) (.001)
Panel II: Linear IV
Binary instrument
Family income in 10000 NOK .022 -.012 .033
(.057) (.011) (.023)
Panel III: Linear IV
Full set of instruments
Family income in 10000 NOK .026 -.008 -.017
(.020) (.006) (.013)
Panel IV: Quadratic OLS
Family income in 10000 NOK .051 -.010 .032
(.002) (.000) (.002)
Quadratic income (x 100) -.016 .008 -.008
(.005) (.001) (.004)
Panel V: Quadratic IV
Full set of instruments
Family income in 10000 NOK .180 -.030 .234
(.087) (.016) (.109)
Quadratic income (x 100) -.302 .042 -.401
(.164) (.021) (.210)
N 121122 121122 57788
Notes: This table reports OLS and IV estimates of the linear and quadratic family income model. Panels
I and IV display the OLS results, whereas Panels II, III, and V show the IV results. Panel II uses
only the binary instrument (born in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy variable). Panels III and V use
the full set of instruments (born in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy variable and interactions with family
background variables). A full set of controls is used in all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are
heteroskedastic robust.
Source: Administrative registers from Statistics Norway.